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SYMPOSIUM OVERVIEW
What constitutes a moral violation in the modern consumer’s 
mind, and what are the consequences of those moral judgments? Al-
though morality is becoming an increasingly popular topic across 
fields, our understanding of the determinants and consequences of 
negative moral judgments in consumer contexts is underdeveloped. 
This is especially relevant in the modern world, with the increas-
ing use of morally relevant technology (e.g., genetic modification), 
attempts for firms to be viewed as moral (e.g., corporate social re-
sponsibility), and exposure of consumers to moral violations through 
news and social media outlets. Our four papers draw on and con-
tribute to the moral values and judgment literature (Barasch et al. 
2014; Baron and Spranca 1999; Graham et al. 2013; Haidt 2001; 
Rozin 1999) by exploring how consumers’ moral values lead them 
to view certain products (Scott, Inbar, and Rozin), firms’ behavior 
(Kelly and Small), and their own behavior (Lin, Reich, and Kreps) 
as moral violations, and examining consumption consequences of 
being exposed to those violations (Lin, Reich, and Kreps; Dong 
and Zhong). 
Scott, Inbar and Rozin find that genetic modification (GM), 
which is increasingly prevalent across the world, is widely met with 
moral opposition. They examine different roots of this opposition 
across cultures (US and Europe), and further find that opposition is 
only somewhat mitigated when consumers read about potential mor-
al benefits of GM (e.g., saving lives). Thus, technological advance-
ments that can serve moral ends can ironically be viewed as immoral. 
Kelly and Small also examine when consumers view actions that 
achieve objectively “good” outcomes as immoral. They investigate 
this question in the increasingly common context of corporate social 
responsibility and find that second-mover companies (i.e., following 
another company’s CSR behavior) are viewed as less authentically 
motivated, and are thus seen as less virtuous than first-movers. 
Moving away from firms and products, Lin, Reich, and Kreps 
examine when people’s own consumption is judged as immoral, 
touching on both antecedents and consequences of moral violations. 
They show that after exposure to moral violations, consumers desire 
to feel negative emotions, and thus view hedonic consumption as a 
moral violation and avoid it (e.g., getting ice cream after the Holo-
caust Museum). Consumers also feel uncomfortable when negative 
moral content is followed by hedonic frivolous content in popular 
social media contexts (i.e., Twitter). Dong and Zhong further exam-
ine consumption consequences of moral violations. They find that, 
after exposure to moral violations, consumers choose products that 
conform to majority preferences (e.g., products with higher market 
share). Furthermore, they provide evidence that they choose such 
products to restore the social order disrupted by those violations. 
Our papers use diverse methodologies and theoretical perspec-
tives to examine the role of moral judgment in consumer behavior. 
Furthermore, while clearly focused around moral violation, our pa-
pers cover a wide range of topics (GM, CSR, hedonic consumption, 
conformity), and each contributes uniquely to the moral judgment 
literature while offering practical implications for marketers and con-
sumers. Thus our session should appeal to a broad audience at ACR.
Explaining Moralized Opposition to  
Genetically Modified Food in the U.S. and Europe
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Genetically modified (GM) food has become prevalent. Eighty-
three percent of soybean plants and 29% of corn grown worldwide 
is GM (ISAA 2015). Yet, consumers are very opposed to GM food. 
Protesters from the Philippines to Australia to the United States con-
tinue to destroy genetically modified crops (Harmon 2013). A wealth 
of research has focused on the rational and quasi-rational factors un-
derlying opposition to GM, such as beliefs about risks and benefits 
(Gaskell et al. 2004; Siegrist 2000). In the present research, we ex-
pand the scope of explanations about opposition to GM food. We find 
GM food opposition is moralized and based on sacred values (Baron 
and Spranca 1997; Rozin 1999). Consumers view the very process 
of genetic modification as morally repugnant, regardless of its risks 
and benefits. We use this moralization framework to investigate two 
puzzles about GM food: 1) consumers’ (in)sensitivity to risk-benefit 
arguments and 2) why Americans and Europeans have different at-
titudes to GM food, despite the cultural similarity between the U.S. 
and Europe.
First, we examine whether attitudes to GM food are moralized in 
a representative U.S. sample (N = 540). We asked participants a num-
ber of agree/disagree questions regarding “genetically engineering 
plants and animals for human consumption”, including 1) “I oppose 
this”; 2) “This should be prohibited no matter how great the benefits 
and minor the risks from allowing it”. Following Baron and Spranca 
(1997) and Scott, Inbar, and Rozin (2016), we defined GM moraliza-
tion using questions 1 and 2. The majority (64.9%) of consumers 
in the U.S. were opposed to GM (said “yes” to Q1). Moreover, the 
majority of this opposition was moralized opposition (said “yes” to 
Q2; 81.3% of opponents, which is 52.8% of the total sample). These 
moralized opponents indicated they are evidence-insensitive, and 
they would oppose GM food no matter the cost-benefit analysis. 
In order to directly assess evidence-insensitivity of moralized 
opponents, we randomly assigned moralized opponents to view one 
of two opposition challenges: a moral benefit challenge and open-
ended challenge (adapted from Baron and Spranca, 1997). In the 
moral benefit challenge, consumers considered and rated the accept-
ability of golden rice, a crop produced by non-profit companies to 
reduce death and blindness from Vitamin A deficiency. In the open-
ended challenge, consumers wrote about any situation in which 
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GM would be acceptable, if they could think of such a situation. In 
both conditions, consumers were given the opportunity to change 
their moralization position and indicate that they would be willing 
to change their minds depending on the risks and benefits (i.e., re-
answer Q1 & Q2, see above). Only 26.3% of moralized opponents 
shifted their position after viewing the moral benefit challenge; even 
fewer (13.7%, p < .001) shifted their position after viewing the open-
ended challenge. Moralized consumers were evidence insensitive to 
both challenges.
Next, we examined the difference between attitudes in Europe 
(Germany & France) and the United States. Prior work suggests that 
Europeans find GM food more unacceptable than Americans (Gas-
kell et al., 1999), but it is unclear whether Europeans and Americans 
oppose GM food for the same or different reasons. We find that Eu-
ropeans are more moralized towards GM than the United States, and 
that the bases of moralization differ across countries.
We administered the same survey described above to a repre-
sentative sample of French (N = 500) and German (N = 519) partici-
pants. Europeans were more moralized than Americans. Moralized 
opposition was more prevalent in France and in Germany as com-
pared to the U.S. (85.21% in France vs. 52.82% in USA, t = 10.40, p 
< .001; 72.69% in Germany vs. 52.82% in U.S., t = 6.40, p < .001). 
Even among only opponents (i.e., excluding supporters), moraliza-
tion was more prevalent in Europe (93.15% in France vs. 81.33% in 
U.S., t = 4.80, p < .001; 87.48% in Germany vs. 81.33% in USA, t 
= 2.27, p = .024). 
Consistent with these self-report measures of moralization, Eu-
ropeans behaved more insensitive to evidence. Whereas 26.3% of 
U.S. moralized opponents shifted to non-moralized opposition af-
ter viewing the moral benefits challenge, only 15.8% of French and 
9.8% of German moralized opponents shifted after this challenge 
(U.S. v. France, p = .021; U.S. v. Germany, p < .001). Similarly, 
whereas 13.7% of U.S. moralized opponents shifted after viewing 
the open-ended challenge, a mere 3.3% of French and 6.6% of Ger-
man moralized opponents shifted their opinions (U.S. v. France, p = 
.036; U.S. v. Germany, p = .002).
Finally, we examined two potential bases of opposition. We 
measured connectedness to the natural world (Schultz, 2001) and 
religiosity. Connectedness to the natural world might capture the in-
tuition that humans shouldn’t “tamper with nature.” Connectedness 
to the natural world predicted increased GM opposition in all coun-
tries, and France and Germany felt more connected to the natural 
world than the United States. On the other hand, religiosity might 
capture the intuition that GM is the equivalent of “playing God.” 
Religiosity was higher in the United States, and religiosity predicted 
increased GM opposition in the United States better than in France or 
Germany. These results were robust across many operationalizations 
of GM opposition, connectedness to nature, and religiosity and were 
robust to demographic controls. 
Taken together, across 1559 participants and representative 
samples from three different countries we find strong support for a 
moralization or sacred values framework of GM opposition. Consis-
tent with this framework, most opposition is moralized opposition, 
and these opponents are unmoved by strong arguments about risks 
and benefits. Instead they seem to be opposed to the very process 
of GM itself, which, regardless of risks and benefits is considered 
intrinsically reprehensible. Furthermore, opposition may be stronger 
and more moralized in France and Germany (vs. the U.S.) in part due 
to stronger connectedness to the natural world, but religiosity plays a 
bigger role in the United States. 
The First-Mover Authentic Advantage:  
How Order of Entry Signals the Purity of Motives
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Companies engage in costly “corporate social responsibility” 
(CSR) because they can gain increased customer loyalty (Maignan, 
Ferrell, & Hult, 1999) and purchase intentions (Elfenbein & Mc-
Manus, 2010; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001), improved product quality 
perceptions (Blair & Chernev, 2014), and an enhanced reputation 
(Brammer & Pavelin, 2006). However, they run the risk of losing 
credit if their good deeds are seemingly motivated by self-interested 
motives (Newman & Cain, 2014; Vlachos et al., 2009). This aversion 
to impure motives, or inauthenticity more generally, extends beyond 
the prosocial behavior of firms. Consumers value authenticity in a 
number of domains (see Newman & Smith, 2016 for review). For 
example, Newman & Bloom (2012) find that consumers devalue 
intentional copies of paintings, which is consistent with plagiarism 
research demonstrating an aversion to stealing credit, a very self-
serving act (see Mandel, Fast, & Olson, 2015 for review).
These results underscore the importance of appearing authen-
tic as well as the skepticism and even distaste towards copying. We 
build on these insights to predict that companies who copy the origi-
nal prosocial actions of another company will be judged as less be-
nevolent and that this will be due to an inference about the impurity 
of their motives. 
 While the idea of first-movers being inherently authentic has 
been discussed in the first-mover literature (Kamins & Alpert, 2004), 
it has yet to be explicitly tested. Rather, the first-mover advantage 
literature began simply with descriptive evidence that market pio-
neers have larger market shares than later entrants (Robinson, 1988; 
Robinson and Fornell, 1985; Urban et al., 1986). First-movers 
are generally perceived more favorably than followers and have a 
greater advantage the more similar the follower is to them (Carpen-
ter and Nakamoto, 1989). Explanations for this advantage include: 
increased exposure frequency, familiarity, recall, and representative-
ness, as well as pioneer image/self-image consistency and the ap-
plication of consumer beliefs about first-mover traits such as quality 
and reliability (see Niedrich and Swain 2003 for review). The pres-
ent research seeks to enrich this evidence by examining the role of 
judged motives. In doing so, it sheds light on when the first-mover 
advantage is likely to be particularly strong.
In the context of CSR and other prosocial activities, we expect 
that first-movers will be perceived as more benevolent than follow-
ers. If a company is first to do some type of CSR action, being first 
suggests that that act must be consistent with the company’s charac-
ter (i.e. “good”). In contrast, a company that copies the CSR action 
of another will appear less genuine. We further expect that the mo-
tive purity of a first-mover will translate into more positive overall 
attitudes. Because motive purity is so important for prosocial actions 
(Barasch et al., 2014; Berman et al., 2015), we further hypothesize 
that the first-mover advantage will be greater for prosocial innova-
tions than for self-interested innovations. 
In Study 1 (N = 301), participants evaluated first-mover and fol-
lower companies with domain-related CSR programs. Participants 
rated both the first-mover and the follower on social goodness (α = 
.962) and motive purity (α = 0.949). Across three industry scenarios, 
first-movers were judged as more benevolent (M = 5.52, SD = 1.10) 
and purely-motivated (M = 4.59, SD = 1.34) than followers (M= 
4.67, SD= 1.08; M = 3.82, SD = 1.26, respectively; all ps < .001), 
with motive purity mediating the effect on benevolence judgments 
here and in subsequent studies.
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In Study 2 (N = 160), we examined whether the first-mover au-
thentic advantage is larger for CSR activities than for self-interested 
activities. Participants evaluated first-movers and followers and ei-
ther judged companies whose innovations (and copied innovations) 
were self-interested (cost-cutting for the company) or prosocial (bet-
ter for the environment). Our key dependent variable moving for-
ward is overall attitude judgments (α = 0.976), because it allows us 
to examine a more general evaluation that is reasonable for partici-
pants to evaluate across both types of innovations. We find that first-
movers are judged more positively overall (M = 5.22, SD = 1.06) 
than followers (M = 4.32, SD = .96; F(1, 156) = 186.15, p < .001). 
We also find that companies with prosocial innovations are viewed 
more positively overall (M = 5.18, SD = .82) than companies that in-
novate in a self-serving way (M = 4.37, SD = .82; F(1, 156) = 37.27, 
p < .001). Importantly, there is a significant interaction between first-
mover status and innovation type (F(1, 156) = 12.73, p < .001) such 
that the first-mover advantage is larger for CSR innovations than for 
self-interested innovations. These same patterns emerge for judg-
ments of social goodness and motive purity.
In Study 3 (N = 200), we conceptually replicate Study 2 using 
scenarios that lack any company- or innovation-specific information. 
This controls for any inherent differences across the CSR and self-
interested innovation scenarios of Study 2. Our results parallel those 
reported in Study 2 (all ps < .001).
In Study 4 (N = 149), we examine whether it is better to copy 
the CSR of a competitor or to persist pursing self-interest. Partici-
pants judged a CSR first-mover as well as a company that responds 
to the CSR innovation by a) copying it, b) innovating in a non-CSR 
way, or c) doing nothing at all. We replicate the finding that first-
movers are judged more positively than each type of following com-
petitor (all ps < .01). Nonetheless, CSR copiers are evaluated more 
positively overall (M = 5.11, SD = 1.32) than companies that inno-
vate in a self-interested manner (Ml = 4.20, SD = 1.13) and proceed 
with business as usual (M = 3.73, SD = 1.00; all ps < .001). In other 
words, CSR copiers are penalized for having impure motives, but 
they still receive more credit than companies that do no good at all. 
We demonstrate that being first at doing something benevolent 
signals something positive above and beyond the action. Put another 
way, copying a good action raises doubt about the purity of the com-
pany’s motives, which lowers the amount of credit that the company 
reaps. This underscores the importance of inferred motives for CSR 
activities.
When Feeling Good Feels “Wrong”: Avoiding Hedonic 
Consumption When It Reflects Immoral Character
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
People judge others’ moral characters based on their emotional 
responses to moral situations (Barasch et al. 2014; Szczurek, Monin, 
and Gross 2012), perhaps because emotions play such a strong role 
in moral judgments (Graham et al. 2013; Haidt 2001). We propose 
that people turn the same judgment inward, and that this judgment 
affects their desire to consume hedonic experiences. In particular, in 
contrast to traditional accounts of hedonic emotion regulation (Gross 
and Thompson 2007), we posit that people desire to experience neg-
ative emotions in response to moral violations and negatively va-
lenced moralized content, because experiencing positive emotions 
would reflect poorly on their moral character. As a consequence, we 
predict that consumers will avoid repairing emotions through he-
donic consumption after viewing negative moralized content, and 
that they will feel uncomfortable when their ability to feel negatively 
is disrupted.
Study 1 tested whether consumers feel moral self-reproach 
(i.e., guilt) when they do not feel negatively enough about negative 
moralized content using a 3 (emotion feedback: lower, higher, no 
feedback) x 2 (moralized content: moralized vs. nonmoral) design. 
An experimenter attached a physiological measurement device to the 
participant’s palm and informed participants that they would view a 
sad video clip while he (ostensibly) monitored their emotional re-
sponse in the next room. Participants viewed a sad moral (from a 
documentary about Bullying) or a sad nonmoral (from ET) film clip. 
The experimenter then interrupted the clip, claiming that he had to 
stop the study because the participant was feeling less sad or sadder 
than previous participants, or because he was having trouble with 
the equipment. Participants then reported how guilty they felt. Those 
who viewed the moralized clip felt guiltier when they thought they 
felt less sad (M=2.07, SD=1.14) than others than when they thought 
they felt sadder than others (M=1.40, SD=.66; p<.001), or when they 
were given no feedback, (M=1.54, SD=.94; p=.001). In contrast, the 
level of guilt for those who saw the nonmoralized clip was not affect-
ed by emotion feedback others (Mlower=1.41, SD= 75; Mhigher=1.30, 
SD=.65; Mno_feedback=1.33, SD=.51; ps>.40). A moderated mediation 
analysis revealed that the moral content, and not emotional intensity, 
of the clip explained this effect [.013, .357]. Thus, participants felt 
they had violated a moral standard by not feeling adequately nega-
tive about a moralized clip, suggesting that people desire to nega-
tively in response to negative moralized content.
Studies 2-4 tested whether consumers are reluctant to repair 
their moods by engaging in hedonic consumption after viewing neg-
atively valenced moralized stimuli. In study 2, participants created 
a hypothetical itinerary for a trip to Washington, DC. They read that 
they would visit a museum with moralized content (the Holocaust 
Museum) or nonmoralized content (an art museum). Participants 
scheduled two other activities: going for ice cream (hedonic) or tak-
ing a walk on the Potomac River (neutral). They chose which should 
come before and which after the museum. Participants sequenced the 
ice cream trip after the Holocaust Museum less frequently (62.63%) 
than after the art museum (86.02%), p<.001. This was mediated by 
how it would reflect on their moral character to eat ice cream after 
visiting the museum they visited [.033, .146].
In study 3, participants viewed Beyoncé’s “Formation” music 
video, and focused on the aesthetic or moral aspects (e.g., themes 
of racial discrimination) of the video, thus holding content constant. 
Afterwards, they chose between viewing a clip from America’s Fun-
niest Home Videos or engaging in a meditative breathing task for the 
next study. Participants were less likely to choose America’s Funni-
est Home Videos after focusing on the moral aspects (58.06%) the 
music video than when they focused on aesthetic aspects (68.75%), 
p=.05.
Study 4 ruled experienced affect out as an alternative explana-
tion. Participants viewed the same negative moral and nonmoral film 
clips from study 1 (Bully documentary clip vs. ET clip). They then 
chose between viewing a Bud Light ad or sitting in silence for 30 
seconds. Participants were less likely to view the Bud Light ad after 
the moralized clip (37.69% vs. 56.86%; p<.001). This was mediated 
by how poorly it would reflect on their moral character to view the 
Bud Light ad after the video they viewed [-.12, -.04] and held true 
when controlling for how sad the video made participants feel.
In study 5, we explored the consequences of being exposed to 
moral content directly followed by hedonic, nonmoral content by 
using Twitter “tweets.” Participants viewed six negative tweets—
three moral (e.g., about rape culture on college campus) and three 
nonmoral (e.g., about a bacterial outbreak among olive trees). Each 
tweet was randomly followed by one of six positive tweets—three 
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virtuous (e.g., about a paralyzed student being thrown a prom that he 
missed), and three frivolous (e.g., about eating Chipotle every day). 
Participants rated how comfortable the tweets made them feel (ap-
propriate, comfortable, good). When the second tweet was frivolous, 
participants felt more uncomfortable when the first tweet was moral 
(M=3.00, SD=1.12) than when it was nonmoral, (M=3.47, SD=1.21; 
p=.02). However, this was not true when the second tweet was virtu-
ous, (Mmoral=3.90, SD=1.23; Mnonmoral=3.90, SD=1.18; p=.44; interac-
tion p=.004). Individual ratings of tweets revealed that, when the 
second tweet as high in frivolous content, moral content of the first 
tweet predicted discomfort whereas when they were low in frivolous 
content, p=.002, moral content of the second tweet did not predict 
discomfort, p=.81, interaction p=.006. Thus, people feel more com-
fortable repairing their moods through moralized positive content, 
rather than through a cheap laugh.
Practically, our research suggests that marketers should devel-
op different strategies following negative nonmoralized and moral-
ized content, and that social media outlets should build algorithms 
to separate negative moral content (e.g., tragic news stories) from 
frivolous content (e.g., celebrity gossip). Theoretically, we contrib-
ute to a broader understanding of the role that emotion plays in moral 
contexts (Haidt 2001), and when people are motivated to experience 
negative emotion (Coleman and Williams 2013; Tamir, Mitchell, and 
Gross 2008). We also qualify judgment and decision making litera-
ture on the preferences for sequences of events that improve over 
time (Loewenstein and Prelec 1993).
Witnessing Moral Violations Increases  
Conformity in Consumption
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
News reports of unethical behaviors have become a regular fea-
ture on TV programs, newspapers, radio stations, and websites. Con-
sumers are constantly exposed to moral violations, from infamous 
fraud by such companies as Enron, Lehman Brothers, and, more re-
cently, Volkswagen to everyday transgressions such as tax evasion 
and adultery. Such unethical behaviors violate established moral 
codes and principles held by the majority of the society (Haidt 2012) 
and are usually recognized as breaches of social order. Despite the 
prevalence of moral violations, little is known about how witnessing 
them may affect consumer choice.
The current research highlights a novel influence of witness-
ing moral violations on consumers’ preference for majority-endorsed 
(vs. minority-endorsed) options. We propose that moral violations 
pose a threat to social order and that mere exposure to them could 
heighten individuals’ endorsement of conformist attitudes (Murray 
and Schaller 2012) by inducing a desire to correct wrongs (e.g., 
punishing the moral transgressors) and prevent future transgressions 
(e.g., adhering to social norms). In the domain of consumption, the 
heightened conformist attitudes could manifest symbolically through 
one’s preference for majority-endorsed (vs. minority-endorsed) 
products or brands (cf. Berger and Heath 2007; Dong, Dai, and Wyer 
2015; Huang, Dong, and Mukhopadhyay 2014).
We further propose that the effect should be attenuated or elimi-
nated under two conditions. First, if the moral violator has already 
been punished by third parties, the need to restore social order should 
be fulfilled and hence the desire to conform to the majority should 
be lessened. Second, if the proposed moral violation effect is driven 
by heightened desire to restore social order, then the effect should 
not hold if conforming to the majority-endorsed option is viewed as 
being complicit with the moral violation, which might create further 
imbalance in social order. We describe four experiments which in-
vestigated these possibilities.
Experiment 1 intends to test the proposed causal relationship 
between exposure to moral violations and conformity tendency. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to 3(moral violation vs. innocent 
error vs. natural disaster) between-subjects conditions. To manipu-
late exposure to moral violation, participants were asked to read and 
comprehend news article describing an immoral behavior (i.e., the 
London Interbank Offered Rate [LIBOR] financial scandal). In the 
innocent error condition, participants were asked to read a similar 
news article but words were changed to describe the LIBOR incident 
as an innocent error. We also included the natural disaster condi-
tion to test whether the effect may generalize to any negative events. 
Afterwards, participants were asked to choose between a majority-
endorsed (vs. minority-endorsed) office magnet as a small token of 
appreciation. The choice results yielded that witnessing moral viola-
tion increased consumers’ tendency to choose a majority-endorsed 
(vs. minority-endorsed) magnet (55.1%), compared with those in the 
innocent error (33.3%; p=.01) or natural disaster conditions (37.7%; 
p=.04), suggesting that this effect is specific to moral violations and 
cannot be generalized to any negative events.
Experiment 2 extended the investigation in two ways: first, 
rather than manipulating moral violations using news article com-
prehension task, participants were exposed to real moral violation 
behavior (i.e., cheating). Second, we investigated whether the effect 
is comparable for observers and direct victims of moral violations. 
It followed a 2(exposure to cheating vs. not) × 2(incentive structure: 
observers vs. direct victims) between subjects design. To manipulate 
exposure to cheating, we had a confederate cheating in a verbal abil-
ity task, and the behavior was observed by other participants in the 
same session. We varied the structure of the incentives that we of-
fered to participants in the verbal ability task such that the confeder-
ate’s cheating behavior would either hurt the participants’ own payoff 
(i.e., direct victims condition) or not (observers condition). We find 
that exposure to cheating (vs. not) increased consumers’ subsequent 
conformity tendency measured using the same magnet choice task 
as in Experiment 1, regardless of whether they are observers (54.0% 
vs. 31.7%; p=.033) or direct victims (58.5% vs. 35.4%; p=.029) of 
the cheating behavior.
Experiment 3 replicated the effect using a different operation-
alization of moral violation (i.e., reading a story about a corruptive 
CEO) and a different measure of conformity tendency (i.e., prefer-
ence for brands with higher versus lower market share) and provided 
direct evidence for the underlying mechanism. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to 3(unpunished corruptive CEO vs. punished cor-
ruptive CEO vs. control) between subjects conditions. As predicted, 
participants who read about a story describing an unpunished cor-
rupt CEO (M=14.21) were more likely to prefer brands that have 
larger market share, compared with those who read about a punished 
corrupt CEO (M=13.50; p=.025) or those who were in the control 
condition (M=13.46; p=.017). In addition, a multi-stage mediation 
analysis revealed that the effect is shown to be driven by the height-
ened perceived threat to social order which subsequently enhanced 
participants’ endorsement of conformist attitudes.
Experiment 4 sought to further test our proposed underlying 
process by using a moderation-by-process design (Spencer, Zanna, 
and Fong 2005). It followed a 2 (exposure to: moral violation vs. 
innocent error) × 2 (majority morality: immoral vs. control) be-
tween-subjects design. We followed exactly the same procedures as 
in Experiment 1 to manipulate exposure to moral violations. Then 
participants were asked to make a choice between joining a majority-
endorsed and a minority-endorsed book club, and we manipulated 
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the perceived morality of the two clubs by varying the occupation in-
formation of the book club members. We find that exposure to moral 
violation (vs. innocent error) increased preference for the majority 
book club only if the majority book club is perceived as neutral or 
moral (44.7% vs. 25.4%; p=.014). The effect disappears if the major-
ity club is perceived as immoral (19.2% vs. 23.4%; p>.53).
Taken together, this research provides fresh insights to the mo-
rality and conformity literature by (a) documenting a novel down-
stream consequence of exposure to moral violations on consumer 
choice and (b) advancing our understanding of the psychological 
functions of conformity in coping with negative consequences of 
witnessing moral violations. Theoretical contributions and market-
ing implications will be discussed.
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